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Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part II)?: The
"Proportionality" Principle under International
Humanitarian Law
Samuel Estreicher*

Abstract
The laws of war are undergoing a fundamental transformation. The first step was the
unmooring of the obligations of states and armiesfrom the binds of reciprociy-tbeprospect
that violations should be avoided because they will result in comparable rep risalsfrom the other
side-that began with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and culminated in the 1977
Addiional Protocols (AP I and II). The second major step-sill an ongoing process-has
been to substitute for the threat of reprisals the grounding of these obligations in enforceable,
positive law. What started haltingly with the promulgation of several 'grave" offenses in
Geneva has-with the establishment of the International Criminal Court, international
criminal tribunalsfor the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, conventions against torture and
other practices, and the sustained pressure of nongovernmental oTanizations-reshapedthe
internationallegallandscape.
The focus of this article is on the so-calledpriniple of 'roportionality, " which regulates
the conduct of warfare in an effort to limit harm to civilians during otherwise legitimate armed
conflict. I use the qualfing adjective "so-called" because 'broportionality" in this context is a
misnomer. The actual obligation, as set forth in AP I, speaks in terms ofprohibiting (and
deferring) attacks expected to cause incidental civilian losses "which would be excessive in
*
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relation to the concrete and direct militay advantage anticipated." Neither the text nor the
polig of IHL requires some form of "balancing" or use of a "slidingscale" to ensure that the
militay objective is 'proportionate," in the sense of being commensurate with the extent of
dvilian losses. What is required is that the militaU use no more force than necessaU to
accomplish concrete, direct militaU objectives.
The proposed "excessive loss" formulation is not only truer to the text of AP I but
provides a sounder, more principled basis for judging violations, for insisting on militag
commander compliance-than the more elastic, manpulable 'roportionality" formulation,
which invites commentators and tribunals to second-guess militaU objectives and compare and
weigh essentialy non-comparablefactors.
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I. THE CHANGING PARADIGM: FROM RECIPROCITY TO
POSITIVE LAW
The law of armed conflict, also referred to as the laws of war or as
international humanitarian law (IH4L), has moved away from a contractual model
to a largely regulatory model. The change started with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions (Geneva I-IV) and culminated in the 1977 Additional Protocols to
the Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol I (AP I) deals with international
armed conflict and Additional Protocol II (AP II) deals with non-international
armed conflict.' With a few notable exceptions (US, India, Israel and Pakistan),
AP I has garnered nearly universal ratification. Even non-ratifying countries,

1

See generally Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Geneva
IV'), 6 UST 3516, TIAS No 3365 (1949), reprinted in Gary D. Solis and Fred L. Borch, Geneva
Conventions 183 (Kaplan 2010); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts ("AP I"), 1125
UN Treaty Ser 3 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts ("AP II"), 1125 UN
Treaty Ser 609 (1978).
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such as the US and Israel, purport to adhere to AP I to the extent it reflects
customary international law (CIL). The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), which sees itself as the guardian of the Geneva process, has over
the years documented state practices in line with AP I prescriptions in order to
lay the case for the essential equivalence between AP I and CIL.2
The Geneva process reflects a fundamental paradigm shift in the rules of
warfare. In earlier times, wars consisted of clashes between standing armies of
opposing states on a distinct "battlefield" at some remove from dense civilian
settlements. The ground-rules for limiting "unnecessary" slaughter and the use
of certain weapons likely to have enduring, devastating effects beyond cessation
of the conflict were enforced by the rule of reciprocity-the prospect that noncompliance would incur retaliatory sanctions against the offending state. The
horrific experience of World War II and its aftermath indicated the need for a
broader, stronger regime than the historic laws of warfare enforced by the rule
of reciprocity. IHL thus emerged from the 1949 Geneva Conventions-rules
which provided greater protections for prisoners of war, further limits on the
range of permissible targets, and most especially with regard to Geneva I-IV, an
overarching concern with the protection of civilians under occupation and
during armed conflicts. The rule of reciprocity-and the threat of reprisals that
backed it up-was pushed aside. Henceforth, the obligations of the parties apply
"in all circumstances" 3-and cannot not be suspended, or violations excused,
because the enemy has flouted the rules of proper warfare.
2

See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, 1 Customary International Humanitarian
Law: Rules (Cambridge 2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, 2 Customay
International Humanitarian Law: Practice (Cambridge 2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on
Customary InternationalLaw: A Contributionto the Understandingand Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed
Conft, 87 Intl Rev Red Cross 175 (2005). For initial criticism of the ICRC study, see W. Hays
Parks, The ICRC Customay Law Study: A PrrminaryAssessment, 99 Am Socy Intl L Proc 208 (2005);
Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, US Dept of State, and William J. Haynes, General
Counsel, US Dept of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Intl Comm of the Red
Cross, Regarding Customary International Law Study, 46 ILM 514 (2007).

3

Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions states that "[t]he High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."
Geneva IV, Art 1. Under Common Article 2, even if the conflict is with a non-party to the
Convention, "the Powers that are Parties shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations" and
shall "be bound by the Convention in relation to [the non-party], if the latter accepts and applies
the provisions thereof." Id at Art 2. Moreover, even where the conflict is with a non-party that
has not assumed the obligations of the Convention, if the conflict is otherwise within the scope of
the Convention, obligations would still be owed to civilians and to civilian property protected by
the Convention. In addition, important aspects of Geneva as well as the 1977 Additional
Protocols are deemed binding on all parties to armed conflict as a matter of CIL. The extent to
which the obligations of the Convention apply to non-signatory and non-state actors will be the
subject of Part 1II in this series, The Deliberate Killng ofCivikans under InternationalHumanitarianLaw.
See note *.
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The second step-still an ongoing process-has been to substitute for the
threat of reprisals the grounding of these obligations in enforceable, positive law.
What started haltingly with the promulgation of several "grave" offenses in
Geneva has-with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
authorized by the UN Security Council, conventions against torture and other
practices, and the sustained pressure of a proliferating number of
nongovernmental organizations seeking to enforce human and IHL rights
violations through international criminal and tort law-reshaped the
international legal landscape.
These developments call for closer attention to AP I, the principal legal
framework for regulating warfare that many writers on international law believe
binds not only ratifying countries, but also all nations and their inhabitants as a
matter of CIL. In an earlier article in this journal, I argued that the growth of
"guerrilla" or irregular warfare-involving non-state armed groups locating
themselves within dense civilian settlements in order to provoke a military
response from occupying or NATO armies that would inevitably cause civilian
casualties and generate additional recruits for the insurgent cause-requires a
greater emphasis on broadly defining and strongly enforcing the duties of
defenders to refrain from locating their military forces and assets among
civilians.4 The overarching objective of IHL is to reduce unnecessary harm to
civilians in the armed conflicts that warfare causes. This risk of harm is a joint
product of both defenders and attackers and has to be regulated as such.
The focus of this article is on the so-called principle of "proportionality,"
which regulates the conduct of warfare in an effort to limit harm to civilians
during otherwise legitimate armed conflict. I use the qualifying adjective "socalled" because "proportionality" in this context is a misnomer. The actual
obligation, as set forth in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b) of AP I, speaks in terms
of prohibiting (and deferring) attacks expected to cause incidental civilian losses
"which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." 5 As the discussion in Part III below shows, the
"excessive loss" formulation is not only truer to the text of AP I but provides a
sounder, more principled basis for judging violations than the more elastic,
manipulable "proportionality" formulation.

4

See Samuel Estreicher, PriilegingAymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duies under International
HumanitarianLaw, 11 Chi J Ind L 425, 431-37 (2011).

5

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 51(5)(b), Art 57(2)(b).
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II. RESORT TO WAR (JUS AD BELLUM) VS. CONDUCT OF

WARFARE (JUS IN BELLO)
Before delving into the proper interpretation of Articles 51(5)(b) and
57(2)(b) of AP I, it is necessary to note the distinction between the rules
governing resort to war (ius ad bellum) and the conduct of warfare (us in bello).
Geneva I-IV and AP I deal only with the latter; Geneva's rules, without passing
on whether the resort to force is lawful, impose humanitarian restrictions on
how the conflict may be conducted.'
Although the principle of proportionality enjoys a long history in
philosophical and religious discourse on the "just war,"' its role in the customary
law ofjus ad bellum is part of the calculus for determining whether resort to force
in a particular case is justified "self-defense." The classic formulation of the
customary rule is found in Secretary of State Daniel Webster's 1841-42
correspondence with his British counterparts concerning an 1837 Canadian
attack in US waters on the Caroline, a small steamer transporting men and
munitions to join a group of insurgents occupying Navy Island, a British
possession on the river boundary between Canada and the US. In April 1841,
Webster wrote to British minister Henry S. Fox: "It will be for [the British] to
show ... that the local authorities of Canada,- even supposing the necessity of
the moment . . . , did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified
by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it." R In July 1842, Britain's Lord Ashburton offered an apology
6

See AP I, preamble (stating that its provisions apply to all persons "without any adverse
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or
attributed to the Parties to the conflict"). The ICRC Commentary on Article 51 notes that the
Diplomatic Conference declined to adopt a distinction between the jus in bello rules applicable to
an aggressor and those applicable to the victim of the aggression. Instead, the preamble
"confirmed the equality of the Parties to the conflict with regard to the obligations laid down by
humanitarian law. This is wholly reasonable, as the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello is fundamental and should always be respected." ICRC, Commentary on the Addidonal Protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 616-17 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (Yves
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, eds) (italics omitted).

7

See US Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response in
Jean Behke Elhstain, ed, just War Theory 101 NYU 1992, 99 ("[T]he damage to be inflicted and
the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms.");
Joseph C. McKenna, Ethics and War A Cathoc View, 54 Am Pol Sci Rev 647, 651 (1960) ("[T]he
seriousness of the injury must be proportioned to the damages that the war will cause."). See
generally Thomas Hurka, Proportionakly in the Morafty of War, 33 Philo & Pub Aff 34 (2005);
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books 2d ed 1992).

8

R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am J Intl L 82, 89 (1938), quoting Letter from
Daniel Webster, Secretary of State to Minister Henry S. Fox, April 24, 1841, 30 Brit Foreign & St
Papers 1129. See also Jennings, 32 Am J Intl L at 82 ("It was in the Camne case that self-defence
was changed from a political excuse to legal doctrine.").
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while repeating the plea of self-defense. 9 Webster responded: "Undoubtedly it is
just, that while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of selfdefence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the
necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation."'
Webster's correspondence respecting the Caroline incident does not refer to
"proportionality" as such, but to the self-defense justification for resort to force,
which limits the scope of the force used to the necessity of its use. Webster is
insisting that "action justified by the necessity of self-defence must be kept
within that necessity helped to produce the modern doctrine that the use of
force in self-defence must not exceed what is necessary and proportionate. . . ."
In a number of cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
reaffirmed the elements of necessity and proportionality in the jus ad bellum law
of self-defense. For the most part, these cases involved relatively confined
incidents and the ICJ was readily able to find the military response not justified
by self-defense. Thus, in the Oil Plaforms case, where, in response to a mine
damaging a US Navy frigate in the Persian Gulf, the US launched "Operation
Praying Mantis," shelling two Iranian oil platforms allegedly used as radar
stations and several Iranian ships and aircraft. The ICJ stated:
[T]he Court cannot assess in isolation the proportionality of the action to
the attack to which it was said to be a response; it cannot close its eyes to
the scale of the whole operation, which involved, inter alia, the destruction
of two Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft. As a
response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United States
warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without loss of life,
neither "Operation Praying Mantis" as a whole, nor even the part of it that
destroyed . . . the platforms, can be regarded, in the circumstances of this

case, as a proportionate use of force in self-defence.12
To similar effect is Nicaragua v United States, which dealt with US assistance
to the "contras," a group opposing the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.1 3
The US defended its support of the contras as a means of helping El Salvador

9

See Letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, July 28, 1842, 30 Brit & Foreign St Papers 195,
quoted in Jennings, 32 Am J Intl L at 89-91 (cited in note 8).

10

12

John Basset Moore, 2 A Digest of InternationalLaw S 217, at 409, 412 (1906), quoting Letterfrom
Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to LordAshburton,Aug. 6, 1842, (internal quotation marks omitted),
See Christopher Greenwood, The Caroine (Max Planck Encyc of Pub Intl L, Apr 2009) online at
(visited Apr
www.mpepil.com/sample-article?id=epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e261&recno
25, 2011).
Case ConcerningOil Plaiforms (Iran v. US), 42 ILM 1334 T 77 (Nov 6, 2003).

13

Mitary and ParamifitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicarv US), 1986 ICJ 14, 25 ILM 1023

11

TI 20-21 (June 27, 1986).
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defend itself against Sandinista-supported rebels in El Salvador.14 The Court
rejected the US claim of necessity because the US measures against Nicaragua
"were only taken, and began to produce their effects, several months after the
major offensive of the armed opposition against the Government of El Salvador
had been completely repulsed . . .

and the actions of the opposition

,

considerably reduced in consequence."" As for the US claim of proportionality
in self-defense:
Whether or not the assistance to the contras might meet the criterion of
proportionality, the Court cannot regard the United States activities . .
relating to the mining of Nicaraguan ports and the attacks on ports, oil
installations, etc., as satisfying that criterion. Whatever uncertainty may exist
as to the exact scale of the aid received by the Salvadorian armed opposition
from Nicaragua, it is clear that these .

.

. United States activities . .. could

not have been proportionate to that aid. ... [T]he Court must also observe
that the reaction of the United States in the context of what it regarded as
self-defence was continued long after the period in which any presumed
armed attack by Nicaragua could reasonably be contemplated.16
Both the necessity and proportionality elements of jus ad bellum analysis
implement a background legal rule barring UN member states from using any
armed force against each other except in self-defense. Article 2, paragraph 4 of
the UN Charter states "All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered."" Absent an exercise of collective security by the
UN Security Council, the only exception is Article 51's recognition of "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."1
The necessity and proportionality inquiry is directed to setting a limit on
the self-defense exception. Necessity requires that there be an armed attack,
presumably an imminent attack ("instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation").' 9 Proportionality requires, as
Webster put, that the defender "did nothing unreasonable or excessive." 20 The
only permitted occasion for the use of force is self-defense and the use of force

14

Id at 1 19.

1s.

Id at 1 237.

16

Id.

17

UN Charter, Art 2,

18

Id at Art 51.

19

Jennings, 32 Am J Intl L at 89, quoting Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State to Minister
Henry S. Fox, April 24, 1841 (cited in note 8).

2

Id.
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"must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."21 For small-scale,
relatively isolated and long-past disturbances like the Caroline incident,
proportionality limits the ability of the defender to use a minor incursion as an
occasion for an all-out war.22 It is a forward-looking concept: "proportionality in
self-defence looks forward. The test is whether the force used is proportionate
to the threat it is designed to meet, not to the events of the past." 23 Those events
are "relevant as an aid to determining the scale of the future threat, not as its
own yardstick for measuring proportionality." 24
III. THE "PROPORTIONALITY" PRINCIPLE IN THE CONDUCT
OF WAR
A. "Disproportionate" or "Excessive" Loss
Jus in bello, the IHL governing the actual conduct of warfare, "is entirely
independent of the requirements of self-defence." 25 It assumes, for purposes of
its application, that the resort to armed force is justified by self-defense but
imposes a number of constraints on the warring parties largely for the protection
of civilians. The "proportionality" or "excessive loss" principle is one of these
limits.
The "proportionality" or "excessive loss" principle first appears as a
codified rule of IHL in Articles 51(5) and 57(2) of AP I:

21
22

2

24

2

Id.
See Yoram Dinstein, War,Aggression and Self-Defence 208-09 (Cambridge 2d ed 1994); David Kaye,
Adjudicating SelfDefense: Discretion, Perception, and the Resort to Force in InternationalLaw, 44 Colum J
Transnad L 134 (2005).
Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the 'War Against Terrorism, 78 Ind Affairs 301, 314
(2002).
Id. While the Oil Plaiforms and Nicaraguarulings could be read to limit proportionality in thejus ad
bellum context to an "eye for an eye" or "tit-for-tat" responses that only meet but do not go
beyond the level of force used, that view is difficult to reconcile with the opinion of ICJ majority
in Adisory Opinion on the legaky of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 35 ILM 809 (July 8, 1996).
In that case, without requiring that the use of nuclear force be in response to a prior nuclear
attack, the majority was willing to countenance the possibility of a nuclear strike in self-defense:
"The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self42. See also id 105(E) ("[I]n view of the current state of
defence in all circumstances." Id
international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake...
."). See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Some Proportionaky Issues Raised by Israel's Use ofArmed Force in
Lebanon, 10 ASIL Insights 1, 10 (Aug 17, 2006), online at http://www.asil.org/insights060817.cfm
(visited Apr 25, 2011).
Greenwood, InternationalLawat 314 (cited in note 23).
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* AP I. Art 51: Protection of the civilian population . . ._5. Among
others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate: . . . (b) an attack which may be expected to cause

incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
* AP I. Art 57: Precautions in attack .. . 1. In the conduct of military
operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects. . . . 2. With respect to

attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) those who plan
or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify
that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects .

..

; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means

and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects; (iii) refrain from deciding to launch any
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated; (b) an attack shall be cancelled
or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a
military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated; (c) effective advance warning shall
be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit.
In addition, violations of some aspects of the "proportionality" or "excessive
loss" principle are treated in Article 85(3)(a)-(c) as "grave breaches" of the
Protocol:
* AP I. Art 85(31: [I]he following acts shall be regarded as grave
breaches of this Protocol, when committed willfully, in violation of
the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or
serious injury to body or health: (a) making the civilian population
or individual civilians the object of attack; (b) launching an
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss
of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in
Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii); (c) launching an attack against works
or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that
such attack will cause extensive loss of life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph
2(a) (iii).

...

The relevant provisions in all three Articles do not use the term
"proportionality" or any of its variants. Rather, all three Articles are aimed at
different types of "indiscriminate" attacks, one of which is defined in Article
51(5) as an attack that is likely to cause incidental loss of civilian life or limb or
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damage to civilian objects "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated . . . ,2' The use of the "excessive loss"
formulation was not accidental. The ICRC's initial draft of Article 46, the
precursor of Article 51 of AP I, spoke in terms of "disproportionate" loss:
The employment of means of combat, and any methods which strike or
affect indiscriminately the civilian population and combatants, or civilian
objectives and military objectives, are prohibited. In particular, it is
forbidden: . . . (b) to launch attacks which may be expected to entail

incidental losses among the civilian populations and cause the destruction of
civilian objects to an extent disproportionate to the direct and substantial
military advantage anticipated. 27
Romania, several Eastern bloc nations and Syria opposed use of the term
"disproportionate", fearing it required comparison of dissimilar things and
would be too easy to manipulate.28 In response, the drafters inserted "excessive"
for "disproportionate" in all three relevant Articles. 29
While the negotiating history is not conclusive, the change in language
from "disproportionate" to "excessive" should have legal consequences. It is
after all the language nations have agreed to by their ratification.
At the least, the requirement of showing "excessive" civilian losses relative
to the military objective cuts against the tendency of some commentators to
distort the concept of "proportionality" as it should apply in the jus in bello

26
27

28

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 51(5) (emphasis added).
3 Protection of War Vitims: Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 123 (Howard S. Levie, ed, 1980),
quoted in William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionaty and ProtocolI in Conventional Warfare, 98 Mil L
Rev 91, 103 (1982). The ICRC's AP Commentary, published in 1987, states "[t[he formula that
was adopted [by the Diplomatic Conference] is very similar to that proposed by the ICRC."
ICRC, Commentary at 625 (cited in note 6). No attempt is made to explain the change in wording
from "disproportionate" to "excessive" in Geneva IV, AP I, Art 52(5). ICRC, Commentary at 625
& n 31 (cited in note 6).
Neither Romania, Syria, nor Hungary could accept the use of the word proportionality:
Romania submitted an amendment deleting Article 51(3)(b) of the ICRC draft
in order to remove any reference to proportionality from the Protocol. Several
delegations spoke in support of the Romanian amendment. Syria could 'not
accept the theory of some kind of 'proportionality' between military
advantages and losses and destruction of the civilian population and civilian
objects, or that the attacking force should pronounce on the matter. Hungary
could not accept the ICRC draft, based on the rule of proportionality 'which
called for a comparison between things that were not comparable, and thus
precluded objective judgment'....
Fenrick, 98 Mil L Rev at 103 (cited in note 27).

2

One commentator argues that the negotiating history sheds little light: "In summary, the
negotiating history indicates that the term 'disproportionate' was proposed initially but, as it was
strongly challenged by several countries because of its subjectivity, 'disproportionate' was replaced
by the term 'excessive'. The record does not indicate the reason for the change but it is probable
that it was a face-saving device for Romania and her supporters." Id at 106.

152

Vol 12 No. 1

PrivilegingAsymmetric Warfare (PartII)

Estreicher

context. Because the concept of "proportionality," standing alone, suggests the
"just deserts" premise of criminal law, some have argued for an "eye for an eye"
or "tit-for-tat" reading. Such a reading would limit the use of force so that it
would not exceed the extent of casualties and other damage inflicted by the
enemy's assault. This, as we have seen, is not the rule injus ad bello. And in any
event, this reading cannot be squared with the forward-looking language of the
AP I provisions referring to an attack "expected to cause" civilian loss "which
would be excessive" relative to the "military advantage anticipated."
The rejection of language of "proportionality" also cuts against the effort
to equate "excessive" losses with "extensive" losses, as was attempted by the
ICRC in commentary written ten years after the Additional Protocols were
signed:
The idea has . . . been put forward that even if they are very high, civilian

losses and damages may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of
great importance. This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the
Protocol; in particular it conflicts with Article 48 (Basic rule) and with

paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article 51. The Protocol does not provide
any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and
damages. Incidental losses and damages should never be extensive. 30
There is no textual basis for this claimed per se prohibition of "extensive"
civilian losses: the references to Articles 48 and 51 do not support the
proposition.3 ' This purported prohibition is also at odds with the ICJ's refusal to
rule out resort to devastating nuclear weapons as a matter of jus ad bellum. Of
course, targeting civilians and attacks without a "specific military objective" are
independently unlawful under the first four subsections of Article 51. Military
commanders, moreover, have the obligation to ensure they can achieve their

30

31

ICRC, Commentary at 626 (cited in note 6). Some commentators have been unduly swayed by this
overbroad statement. See, for example, Paul Reynolds, Q&A: Mid-East War Crimes? BBC News
(uly 21, 2006), online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/5198342.stm (visited Apr 25,
2011) , quoting former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour:
The scale of killings . . . , and their predictability, could engage the personal
criminal responsibility of those involved, particularly those in a position of
command and control. ... [TJhe bombardment of sites with alleged military
significance, but resulting invariably in the killing of innocent civilians, is
unjustifiable.
Article 48 of AP I sets forth the basic "rule of distinction"-"the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." Geneva IV, AP I, Art 48 . Similarly, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 51 state that
civilians "shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations"; and that
civilians "shall not be the object of attack." Id at Art 51, IT 1, 2. But the issue in the present
context assumes a military objective and that the AP has not been otherwise violated, and asks
whether the presence of "extensive" civilian losses, standing alone, violates the "proportionality"
or "excess loss" rule.
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military objectives with the minimum possible civilian losses. But whether due to
defenders co-locating military personnel and assets within dense civilian
populations, civilians failing to heed the warnings required by Article 57(2)(c)
and continuing to remain inside known military objectives, or otherwise, such
losses can still occur without being "excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage."
B. "In Relation to the Concrete and Direct Military Advantage
Anticipated"
This brings us to the major interpretive issue concerning the
"proportionality" or "excessive loss" principle: "disproportionate" or
"excessive" loss in relation to what? The text answers: "the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated." 32 There is no question that the modifiers
"concrete" and "direct" require a real, nontrivial military objective. It is also
correct that the anticipated military advantage is not limited to the immediate
battle that causes the civilian loss at issue but relates to the attack as whole. The
text speaks in terms of "military advantage anticipated" but does not limit that
advantage to the particular battle, which would make little military sense. Not
surprisingly, the Rome Statute's criminal provision in this context refers to
"overall military advantage." 33
But does the text require some form of "balancing" or use of a "sliding
scale" to ensure that the military objective is "proportionate," in the sense of
being commensurate with the extent of civilian losses? For example, W.J.
Fenrick, a senior legal advisor for the Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, writes: "Strictly
speaking, resolution of the proportionality equation requires a determination of

32

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 51(5)(b), Art 57(2)(b).

33

Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute makes the following an international crime, cognizable by
the ICC:
(iv) intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects
or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated....
Id. This was also the position taken by the UK and several other countries when ratifying AP I.
See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds, Documents on the Laws of War 511 (Oxford 3d ed 2000)
(including the ratification statement issued by the UK regarding Article 51 and Article 57, "the
military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated
from the attack considered as a whole. . . ."). "The ICRC stated at the Rome Conference on the
Statute of the International Criminal Court that the addition of the word 'overall' . . . could not be
interpreted as changing existing law." Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 1 Customary International
HumanitarianLaw at 50 (cited in note 2).
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the relative worth of military advantage gained by one side and the civilian
casualties or damage to civilian objectives incurred in areas in the hands of the
other side."'
This type of calculus, however, is not what IHL requires.15 This
formulation invites the second-guessing of military objectives in an ex post
setting when the Protocol's regulatory aim is, as Article 57(2) makes clear, to
influence targeting and other military decisions before they are implemented."
Moreover, other than insisting on "concrete" and "direct" advantage, neither
Article 52 nor Article 57 authorize discounting "the military advantage
anticipated" by some factor based on civilian casualties or civilian property
damage.
Although the Protocol does not directly define "military advantage" or
"military objective," Article 52(2) offers a partial definition in connection with
"objects":
2. Attacks should be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.
We are thus told that while civilians as such "shall not be the object of attack"
under Article 51(2), all "objects which . . . make an effective contribution to
military action and whose . . . destruction . . . offers a definite military

advantages" are subject to attack. But we are not given an easy means of
mediating between these two rules.37

34

W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionaity during the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia, 12
EurJ Intl L 489, 501 (2001).

3s

See Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law ofAttack, in Susan C. Breau and Agnieszka JachecNeale, eds, Testing the Boundaries of InternationalHumanitarianLaw 277, 293 (Brit Inst of Intl and
Comp L 2006):
Complicating matters is pervasive confusion over how to conduct the
proportionality 'test.' Many wrongfully characterize it as balancing, ie, does the
concrete and direct military advantage 'outweigh' resulting collateral damage
and incidental injury? If so, attack is permitted; if not, it is forbidden. The test
is often portrayed as a scale, with the slightest difference tipping the balance.
In fact, the test is one of 'excessiveness.' The rule only bans attacks in which there is
no proportionality at all between the ends sought and the expected harm to civilians
and civilian objects.

3

37

See Geneva IV, AP I, Art 57(2)..
In addition, Article 57(3) of AP I states: "When a choice is possible between several military
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects."
Geneva IV, AP I, Art 57. We are still left with the question as to what the military commander is
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What, then, is the test for determining whether the civilian loss likely to be
caused by an attack "would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage"?" Particularly against the background provided by the
"proportionality" principle's role in the customary law ofjus ad bellum, the proper
test is one of "necessity". Thus, so long as a matter of fact the attack has a
concrete and direct military objective, the determinative question is whether the
commander has used the "least deleterious" (in terms of civilian loss) means of
achieving that objective." This is the "proportionality" and "necessity" test
applicable to choice of weapons or methods of warfare generally. As Professor
(now ICJ Judge) Christopher Greenwood has observed, "the crucial question is
whether other weapons or methods of warfare available at the time would have
achieved the same military goal as effectively while causing less suffering or
injury.""
The Additional Protocol, which is after all ajus in bello document, does not
regulate what military objectives commanders or their superiors can or should
have. 4' It provides that certain weapons cannot be used, that certain objectives
are off limits, and that certain precautions must be taken.42 It provides no
warrant, however, for rating military objectives.
The requirement is not that the military inflict as few civilian losses as
possible in some abstract sense, but that the military inflict as few civilian losses
as possible given "the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."43 This
formulation also has the virtue of avoiding the "apples and oranges"
comparisons inherent in more aggressive conceptions of "proportionality"
review." No complex, metaphysical "exchange value," no "comparison between

to do if there is only one military objective that can obtain the desired military advantage and it
likely entails some civilian losses.

38

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 51(5)(b), Art 57(2)(b).

39

From my late, great colleague, Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in
InternationalLaw, 102 Am J Intl L 715, 728 (2008).
Id, quoting Christopher Greenwood, Command and the Laws ofArmed Conflict *24 (Strategic Combat
Studies Occasional Paper No 4 1993).

40

42

But compare note 25.
See generally Geneva IV, AP I, Art 36, Arts 51-58.

43

Id at Art 51(5)(b), Art 57(2)(b).

44

See, for example, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), FinalReport
to the Prosecutorby the Committee Establishedto Review the NATO Bombing CampaignAgainst the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia gune 8, 2000), 39 ILM 1257, 1271 (2000) ("It is much easier to formulate the
principle of proportionality in general terms than it is to apply it to a particular set of
circumstances because the comparison is often between unlike quantities and values. One cannot
easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular military
objective.").

41
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things that [are] not comparable" 45 is required. The military sets the concrete and
direct military objective: the commander's duty under AP I is to reasonably
minimize civilian losses in pursuit of that objective.'

This is not to gainsay that difficult choices will have to be made at the
margins, but the undertaking for the commander-and hence the inquiry for the
prosecutor, court or tribunal that may be considering criminal or civil
penalties-is not metaphysically daunting. It is relatively manageable, and it, if
the duty is violated, can be a basis for possible culpability.

45
46

See note 28.
Some writers take the view that some same-side losses are required by the proportionate use of
force. This is usually a bald assertion, backed with citations to other commentators who also offer
no basis in the text of AP I or other governing legal instruments for their position. See, for
example, Richard D. Rosen, Targeing Enemy Forces in the War on Terr:r Preserving Civikan Immunity,
42 Vand J Transnatl L 683, 691 n 39, 747-48 (2009). Whether this claim is grounded in "just war"
theory or make good military or political sense in a particular situation, it does not reflect a
requirement of CIL, as embodied in AP I. But compare the confusing discussion in Rebecca J.
Barber, The Proportionakly Equaion: BalancingMifitary Objectives nith Ciilian Lives in Armed Confct in
Afghanistan, 15 J Conflict & Security L 467, 481 (2010) ("The risk of incurring 'own-side casualties'
is not part of the proportionality equation as described in Protocol I. Nevertheless, it is well
recognized that military commanders are entitled to take some measures to minimize the risk to
their own soldiers."), with Barber, 15 J Conflict & Security L at 482 ("It is generally agreed that
complying with the proportionality equation requires a willingness to accept some own-side
casualties. . . ."). Moreover, the view that proportionality requires sustaining some same-side
losses cannot explain the unwillingness of the ICTY prosecutor to indict NATO commanders for
NATO's zero same-side-casualty motivated bombing campaign over Belgrade in 1999. See
generally Final Report to the Prosecutor, 39 ILM 1257 (cited in note 44). On June 2, 2000, the
prosecutor announced her decision not to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. UN
Security Council, 4150th mtg, 1st Sess, 1st series, UN Doc S/PV.4150 3 (2000).
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